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DETERMINING A PARTNER'S
SHARE OF UNREALIZED
RECEIVABLES AT THE
LIQUIDATION OF THE
PARTNER'S INTEREST

BY

STEPHEN UTZ DISCUSSES LIQUIDATING A
PARTNER'S SHARE OF UNREALIZED RECEIVABLES

STEPHEN UTZ

IN A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE PARTNERSHIP,
ACCORDING TO CODE SECS. 736(b) AND 751 (b),
ALONG WITH THE POSSIBLE TAX RAMIFICATIONS.

©2000 S. Utz

The liquidation of a partner's interest in a professional service
partnership may be complicated
by the variety of agreements partners make with respect to the
sharing of client fees. Since service
partnerships usually adopt the
cash-receipts-and-disbursements
method of accounting,1 their receivables are routinely "unrealized
receivables" within the meaning of
Code Sec. 751.2 Professional partners may thus often have a stake
in unrealized receivables during
their tenure as partners and afterwards. Moreover, professional
partnerships frequently hold accounts receivable that are
earmarked in various ways to reflect the roles partners play in
generating those accounts.' For
example, there may be an agreement to credit the partner who
"brought in the client" with a

larger than usual share of the fees
paid by that client, or a partner's
reputation may seem to all partners to justify crediting that
partner with an exceptional share
of fees from clients within a certain industry or from a certain
geographical area. Other aspects
of a partner's role in creating or
maintaining a client relationship
may be reflected differentially in
the allocation of fees from clients
generally. Perhaps most importantly, partners may by agreement
share in collections of accounts
receivable only as long as they continue as partners, with no right to
share in fees collected after they
leave the partnership, or a
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partner's right to share in fees may
depend on whether he or she contributed accounts receivable earned
by him or her before joining the
4
partnership.
Against this background, the
treatment of liquidating distributions to professional service
partners under the combined regime of Code Secs. 736(b) and
751(b) should be sensitive to the
complexities of the business relationship of the partners. The Code
Sec. 751 regulations, however, provide peculiarly incomplete
guidance for determining a
partner's share of unrealized receivables and inventory when a
distribution occurs.' In general, a
distribution has to be re-characterized only to the extent that a
partner either receives Code Sec.
751 property in exchange for his

cent of the sum of all partners'
capital accounts, then the partner
has a 40 percent share of the
partnership's Code Sec. 751 assets.
In many cases, this is no doubt a
plausible approach. But it must
strike many tax experts and taxpayers alike as generally inaccurate
to equate a partner's capital share
with his or her share of partnership receivables. The combination
in the regulation of the examples
with the general rule leaves the
impression that an inflexible rule
may apply.
Frequently encountered arrangements among service partners will
be distorted if partners' interests
in Code Sec. 751 assets, especially,
unrealized receivables, are determined always and only in the
manner indicated by the examples.
The general rule prescribed by the
regulations instead should be
understood as reIF PARTNERSHIPS ARE ENTITIES
specting
the
FOR ANY PURPOSE... IT SEEMS
partnership
agreement's alloINEVITABLE THAT THEY SHOULD
cation of Code
BE SUCH IN THE CONTEXT
Sec. 751 assets,
OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
unless the agreement is a sham
SALES AND LIQUIDATIONS.
or abusive. This
article defends
or her "interest in other property"
that conclusion and also explores
or receives other property in exwhat would constitute a sham or
change for relinquishing any part
abusive agreement in this context.
of his or her "interest in Code Sec.
The purpose of Code Sec. 751 is
751 property."6 All the examples
to prevent the conversion of ordiin the regulations, however, deternary income into capital gain
mine a partner's interests in Code
under the default rule of partnerSec. 751 and other property by ref- ship taxation that characterizes as
erence to the partner's fractional
capital gain a partner's income
7
interest in partnership capital. If
from selling the partnership interthe partnership has Code Sec. 751
est or gain from a liquidating
assets, then the partner's interest
distribution with respect to partin those assets is determined to be
nership
property.
It
is
that fraction of their value equal
commonplace that partnerships are
to the partner's fractional interest
entities for some federal tax purin all partnership capital. If the
poses and aggregates of their owners
partner's capital account is 40 perfor others. If partnerships are enti-

ties for any purpose, however, it
seems inevitable that they should
be such in the context of partnership interest sales and liquidations8
If a partner's interest in a partnership were "disaggregated" on sale
or liquidation of the interest, the
entity approach would be at most
a temporary simplifying feature of
the tax regime. This seemingly inevitable feature of the entity/
aggregate paradigm immediately
suggests the possibility of the "collapsible partnership."
In the relatively early days of
federal corporate taxation,
shrewd taxpayers discovered the
possibility of transforming ordinary income into capital gain by
creating an ordinary-income-producing asset within a corporation
and then selling or liquidating
the corporation-the normal tax
treatment of a stock sale or liquidation was that of the sale of
capital assets, so that the value
of the incorporated asset could
be realized as capital gain. Congress adopted the predecessor of
Code Sec. 341 to combat this
abuse. Code Sec. 341 disallowed
capital gain treatment of sale or
liquidation gains when the corporate form had been adopted or
"availed of" for the purpose of
avoiding ordinary income treatment. The provision was thus
triggered by tax-abusive intent
rather than by the form or effect
of the transactions to which it
applied. By 1954, administrative
experience with Code Sec. 341 had
shown such a "substance" or intent-oriented approach to be of
very limited efficacy. Although
the legislative history of subchapter K does not elaborately set
forth the congressional intent
behind Code Sec. 751, it is evident
from proposals advanced by the
tax bar that the "collapsible partnership" provision of the new
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partnership tax regime was meant
to be triggered by formal test
rather than by a test based on
intent or economic substance.9
The section treats sales and distributions separately, as seems
inevitable given the broadly different treatment in other respects of
partnership sales and distributions
under subchapter K. Under Code
Sec. 751(a), a sale or exchange of a
part or all of a partner's "interest"
in substantially appreciated inventory and unrealized receivables
(these two categories of "hot assets" are defined somewhat more
broadly than the terms may suggest l ) for money or other property
is treated as an amount realized
from the sale of property other
than a capital asset. In other
words, a portion of the consideration a partner receives on selling
all or part of a partnership "interest" (understood as that term is
used elsewhere in subchapter K
and in state partnership law) must
be treated as payment for the value
of the partner's stake in the
partnership's Code Sec. 751 assetssubstantially
appreciated
inventory and unrealized receivables. Obviously, the rule of Code
Sec. 751(a) can be applied only if
the partner's "interest" in hot assets can be ascertained, but Code
Sec. 751 does not indicate how that
"interest" is to be done.
Code Sec. 751(b) recasts any distribution that combines Code
Sec. 751 and non-Code Sec. 751
assets, if the distribution does not
proportionately represent the
distributee's "interest"-through
the partnership-in these categories of assets. More particularly,
the subsection provides that to
the extent that a partner receives
Code Sec. 751 assets in exchange
for his interest in non-Code Sec.
751 assets or vice versa, the transaction shall be considered a sale

or exchange of the distributed
property between the distributee
and the partnership. In effect, as
the regulations make clear, the
usual rules for distributions,
found in Code Secs. 731, 732 and
733, do not apply to the extent
that a partnership distributes to
a partner receives too great a portion of Code Sec. 751 assets or of
non-Code Sec. 751 assets. Instead,
if the distribution is disproportionate, partnership assets of the
class that were under-represented
in the actual distribution are
deemed first to have been distributed. This deemed distribution is
treated in accordance with the
usual distribution rules. Then the
distributee is treated as having
exchanged these assets for the disproportionate portion actually
received. The usual distribution
rules prescribe the treatment of
the rest of the transaction. Again,
the rule of this subsection, like
that of Code Sec. 751(a), can be
applied only if the partner's "interest" in hot assets and other
assets can be ascertained.
Example. Partner A receives
$5,000 cash only in exchange
for her one-half interest in the
property of the AB partnership. Before the distribution,
the partnership assets were the
$5,000 cash and $5,000 in unrealized receivables (in which
the partnership had a zero
basis). Assume that A would
have shared in the receipts
from the collection of the receivables and that the value of
her interest ($5,000) reflects
this "interest" she has in the
receivables. Then Code Sec.
751(b) would recast the distribution as a three-step
transaction. A is deemed first
to receive a distribution of her
one-half share of the receiv-

ables, worth $2,500. She is
deemed then to transfer these
back to the partnership for
$2,500 cash. Finally, she receives a cash distribution of
$2,500. The result of the threestep reconstruction of her
receipt of $5,000 cash is accounted for by her taxable
exchange of $2,500 worth of
receivables for $2,500 cash and
the distribution of the "other
half" of the cash. She recognizes ordinary gain of $2,500
on the exchange of the receivables for cash. The partnership
receives her share of the receivables back with a cost basis of
$2,500. Thus, she is not allowed to escape her "share" of
the ordinary gain inherent in
the receivables.
Although both subsections (a)
and (b) of Code Sec. 751 assume
that we can determine a partner's
"interest" in the partnership's hot
assets and the partner's "interest"
in other assets that underlie the
partnership interest, this article is
concerned primarily with liquidating distributions, and so the
discussion and illustrations that
follow will refer primarily to Code
Sec. 751(b). The arguments herein
apply with equal force, however,
to partnership interest sales subject to Code Sec. 751(a).
How is a partner's "interest" in
the relevant classes of partnership
assets defined? Neither the statute
nor the regulation explicitly does
so. The regulation gives five examples to illustrate the
determination of a partner's interest in Code Sec. 751 and non-Code
Sec. 751 property under various
circumstances." In all the examples, however, it is simply taken
for granted that the partner's "onethird" interest in each class of
partnership property-Code Sec.
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751 or non-Code Sec. 751 property-is determined by the ratio of
the partner's capital account to
total partnership capital. Indeed,
all five examples are premised on
this aspect of the facts of Example
2. The opening sentence of the
example states that "Partnership
ABC makes a distribution to partner C in liquidation of his entire
one-third interest in the partnership. ' 12 Thereafter, Example 2
proceeds smoothly to the conclusion that Partner C's interest in
the accounts receivable and inventory, and indeed all other classes
of partnership property, must be
one-third of each class. The
premise is carried forward through
the remainder of the regulatory
examples, which all deal with the
complete liquidation of Partner
C's one-third partnership interest.
The regulations never hint that
the ratio of a partner's capital interest to total partnership capital
may not always be an appropriate
indicator of the partner's fractional interest in partnership Code
Sec. 751 assets, especially unrealized receivables. This is odd in part
because the standard type of partnership that holds unrealized
receivables within the meaning of
Code Sec. 751 is the cash-method
service partnership, whose partners share the revenues of accounts
receivable in fixed "profit ratios,"
without regard to value of their
interests in (existing) partnership
property, without regard to their
capital accounts and without regard to the present value of
accounts receivable of potentially
very different viability.
Example. Cash-method partnership ABC makes a
distribution to partner C in
liquidation of his entire onethird profits interest in the
partnership, at a time when

C's interest in existing partnership capital is nil because C
has a zero capital account, the
partnership non-Code Sec. 751
assets have fallen in value below their historical or book
value and the partnership has
no special agreement concerning the partners' respective
rights to share in revenues collected with respect to accounts
receivable. Partner C's interest
in partnership property other
than Code Sec. 751 assets has
no value at all. Moreover, C's
capital account is zero, so that
C's fractional interest in partnership capital both for book
and fair market value purposes
is zero. Nevertheless, C's interest in partnership accounts
receivable should be appraised
as equal to a third of its present
value. It is not evident from
the regulation, including the
examples, that a cash liquidation distribution to C should
be regarded as disproportionate with respect to C's interest
in accounts receivable and
therefore taxable in accordance
with Code Sec. 751(b).
By the same token, a mechanical
extrapolation from the regulatory
examples can lead to an unrealistic
overstatement of a partner's interest in unrealized receivables.
Example. The same partnership
makes a cash distribution to
partner C in liquidation of his
entire one-third capital interest
in the partnership at a time
when C's interest in existing
partnership receivables is nil
because C has agreed with partners A and B that they alone
should be allocated revenues
from these receivables because
they brought in the clients who
own these accounts. C has a one-

third interest in existing partnership capital-which does not
include the value of accounts
receivable because this is a cashmethod partnership-but no
interest in partnership accounts
receivable. Following the regulation examples, C should
nevertheless be treated as having received a disproportionate
distribution of cash, because
one-third of accounts receivable
were not distributed to C in
kind. Yet C has no right to share
in the collection of these accounts receivable.
Although the regulation nowhere
indicates that the determination of
a partner's "interest" in Code Sec.
751 assets may have to take into account a possible diversity of
partners' rights to share in these
assets, it seems obvious that the
regulation must allow for such diversity. The result in the foregoing
example cannot be correct.
Example. A and B are equal law
partners. They admit C as a partner with a one-third share in the
collection of new and existing
firm receivables as long as C remains a partner, but if C leaves
the partnership, C is to have no
share in the later receipts on receivables generated while C was
a partner. During C's tenure as
a partner, the partnership acquires an office building with
recourse debt, and C's capital
account reflects C's one-third
share of the purchase price of
the building. Partner C has a
one-third interest in all partnership receivables, but that interest
is extinguished when C leaves
the partnership. C receives a
cash payment measured by his
share of the then-value of the
office building. Following the
regulatory examples blindly,one
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might conclude that the cash
payment is to be characterized
as a disproportionate distribu-

tion under Code Secs. 736(b)
and 751(b). Applying Code Sec.
751(b), a portion of C's gain is
therefore characterized as ordinary,though it in fact represents
only C's share of the Code Sec.
1231 gain on the building.
Of course, the characterization
under Code Sec. 751 will not matter
if the partner's cash payment for
partnership property is very small,
as may be the case generally for service partnerships. But it seems likely
that many service partnerships have
property like the office building that
may result in Code Sec. 736(b) payments. Whether these payments are
treated as including ordinary gain
will depend almost exclusively on
whether the departing partner is
treated as having an interest in unrealized receivables.
The treatment suggested in the
example should not be controversial unless the agreement among the
partners may have been entered
into in order to lower the aggregate tax liability of the partners.
One approach would to ascertain
the partners' interests in Code Sec.
751 and non-Code Sec. 751 property by reference to the partnership
agreement if its prescription concerning these interests really
governs the partners' division of
the net worth of the partnership
when a partner's interest is liquidated, and if, when adopted, the
agreement's provisions concerning
liquidation interests in particular
classes of assets was not likely to
reduce the partner's tax liabilities
in the aggregate. This standard is
obviously similar to the "substantial economic effect" standard
prescribed by Code Sec. 704(b) and
the regulations thereunder for partnership allocations.

Agreements to share current collections from pre-existing
receivables and to relinquish claims
against post-departure collections
obviously can serve a reasonable
business purpose in a partnership
of changing composition.13

The standard proposed in the
foregoing paragraphs can be
adapted to provide a general way
of treating partners' interests in
Code Sec. 751 and non-Code Sec.
751 property. Under the revised
Uniform Partnership Act, partners
are free to agree that they shall have
different interests in specific items
of partnership property. 4
Obviously, there is no direct statutory or regulatory authority for
considering the tax situations of the

Example. Suppose that in
the previous example the
ABC partnership agreement
had from the outset prescribed
that on C's
withdrawal the
partnership
should pay C
IT HAS BE
'EN SUGGESTED ALREADY
an amount
THAT THE GENERAL RULE MIGHT
equal to the
product of C's
BE TO F?ESPECT PARTNERSHIP
profit ratio
AGREEM ENTS, INSOFAR AS THEY
and the fair
DETEF?MINE THE PARTNERS'
market value
INTER'ESTS" IN UNDERLYING
of partnership
assets other
PAF'TNERSHIP ASSETS,
than receivREGAR
DLESS OF THE TIMING
ables. Suppose
AND A PPARENT MOTIVATION
further that
the partners'
OF T HESE AGREEMENTS.
aggregate tax
liabilities
could not foreseeably have
respective partners and the ex ante
been reduced by such a prolikelihood that an agreement convision. Then the thesis of this
cerning unrealized receivables will
article is that the partnership
save them taxes in the aggregate.
agreement should be allowed
Code Sec. 751 has been part of subto determine the extent of C's
chapter K since 1954 and the
interest in Code Sec. 751 and
regulations implementing the secnon-Code Sec. 751 property.
tion are of long standing as well.
What tinkering Congress has done
If a partner apparently loses his
with the section primarily affects
or her interest in unrealized rethe definition of substantially apceivables on leaving the
preciated inventory and unrealized
receivables, not the manner in
partnership, and the fair market
which a partner's share of such
value of the partner's share of
property should be determined.
the value of partnership property
The "anti-abuse" regulation, Reg.
is determined under the partnership agreement only by reference
§1.701-2, may at first sight appear to
ground an approach like that proto assets other than receivables,
a cash liquidating distribution
posed here. But the general language
should not be characterized in
used in the regulation to define its
part as a payment for unrealized
scope indicates that substance-overreceivables.
form analysis is not to be applied
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to aspects of subchapter K that are
intended primarily to allow form to
control the tax treatment of a transaction."5 As the anti-abuse regulation
says, "certain provisions of subchapter K and the regulations thereunder
were adopted to promote administrative convenience and other policy
objectives, with the recognition that
the application of those provisions
to a transaction could, in some circumstances, produce tax results that
do not properly reflect income." Reg.
§1.701-2(a)(3). Code Sec. 751 is certainly a "mechanical" provision that
satisfies this description. It was designed, by all accounts, to avoid the
more substance-oriented approach
taken with respect to collapsible corporations in Code Sec. 341.16
Moreover, Reg. §1.701-2(d) Ex. 4 indicates that at least Code Sec. 751(e)
was intended to be interpreted as
sanctioning form over substance in
the context of tiered partnership
structures set up for the purpose of
reducing partners' aggregate tax liability.
Thus, even taking the "antiabuse" regulation into account,
there is no reasonably straightforward authority for imposing the
"substance"-oriented restriction
discussed above. As has been men-

tioned, and as the anti-abuse regulation itself confirms, Code Sec.
751 was apparently intended to be
applied mechanically. If the determination of a partner's separate
interests in Code Sec. 751 assets and
in non-Code Sec. 751 assets presupposes that something like the
"substantiality" (in the sense of the
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations) of
the partnership agreement must
first be analyzed, the application
of Code Sec. 751 will be anything
but mechanical.
What alternative is there? It has
been suggested already that the
general rule might be to respect
partnership agreements, insofar
as they determine the partners'
"interests" in underlying partnership assets, regardless of the
timing and apparent motivation
of these agreements. If so, deliberate
manipulation
of
partnership agreements will at
least sometimes frustrate the purposes of Code Sec. 751.
There is of course nothing to prevent the IRS from invoking the
anti-abuse regulation to prevent an
abusive appeal to a partnership agreement in the Code Sec. 751 context.
Yet if this were to become a routine
administrative practice, the purpose

and justification of the anti-abuse
regulation should itselfbe called into
question. Taxpayers certainly should
not hesitate to test this position, if
the IRS should adopt it. Indeed,
there is at least implicit authority
for a mechanical deference to the
terms of a partnership agreement,
regardless of motivation. Even a
clear tax-avoidance motive may deserve respect, as far as one can tell
from the legislative background
and interpretative history of Code
Sec. 751.
In brief, the puzzles left unresolved by Code Sec. 751 and the
regulation it authorizes are serious
and pervasive in the context of
some cash-method and especially
professional service partnership liquidations.
The
intended
mechanical approach that is evident in the design of Code Sec. 751
cannot deal fairly with bona fide
variations in the manner in which
service partners may share in accounts receivable. A "substance over
form" approach seems at odds with
the legislative intent behind the
provision, forming part of the pattern of "form over substance"
features in subchapter K, the existence of which even the anti-abuse
regulation acknowledges.
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